If a program does not fulfill a given specification, a model checker delivers a counterexample, a run which demonstrates the wrong behavior. Even with a counterexample, locating the actual fault in the source code is often a difficult task for the verification engineer.
Introduction
Debugging is one of the most time consuming parts of the software development cycle. Since the complexity of software systems is increasing, there is also an increasing demand in tools that aid the programmer in the debugging process.
Debugging consists of three steps: detecting that the program contains a fault, localizing the fault, and correcting the fault. Detecting faults has been an active area of research. There exists less work on fault localization and correction. In this work we focus on localization and present a novel method for determining the cause of faults in C programs.
We assume that we are given a program written in C and a specification. Suppose the program contains a fault, and we have a counterexample showing that the specification does not hold. We use the counterexample to create an extended version of the program. We fix the inputs of the program according to the values of the counterexample and introduce abnormal predicates for every component in the program. If the abnormal predicate of a component is true, we assume that the component works abnormally. Therefore, we suspend the original behavior of the component and replace it by a new input. The localization problem is then one of finding which abnormal predicates need to be asserted and how the respective components have to be replaced in order to fulfill the original specification. In order to find abnormal predicates we negate the original specification to state that it is not possible to satisfy it by suspending components, and again use a model checker to verify the new system. If we find a failing run, we can derive from it the components that work abnormally and a replacement such that the program is fixed for the original counterexample.
Related Work
The presented work is closely related to the theory of model-based diagnosis (MBD) [21, 16] which has its origins in diagnosing physical systems. Console et al. [4] show the applicability of MBD to fault localization in logic programs. Much work has been done in applying MBD to hardware designs on the source code level [9, 25, 20] . The theory has also been successfully applied to debugging programs written in a subset of Java [19, 18] . In MBD, a model is derived from the source code. The model, together with a given failure trace, describes the actual, faulty behavior of the program. The correct output for the trace must be provided by an oracle (typically by the verification engineer). Model based diagnosis yields a set of components that explains the discrepancy between the model and the desired behavior but does not give a replacement for those components. In our approach we do not require a certain failure trace and an oracle that delivers the correct output values for that trace. Instead we assume that a specification is given and use a verification tool to obtain an arbitrary finite failure trace that proves that the specification is violated. We furthermore use the specification to automatically derive a correct behavior for that trace.
A related theory to model-based diagnosis was developed by Veneris, Smith, et al. See, for instance, [7] . They use a SAT solver to diagnose sequential circuits but do not consider specifications: the user must provide the proper behavior of the circuit for a given counterexample.
One application of diagnosis is design rectification. Huang and Cheng [13] develop a theory to locate sites at which a circuit can be modified to satisfy a new specification. In their case, the specification is given as another circuit.
In [15, 23] a game based approach is presented for debugging. Using an LTL specification, the approach is able to locate a fault and provide a correction that is valid for all possible input values. Recently, this work was extended to pushdown systems to handle recursive Boolean programs. Details on the approach and its application to abstractions from C programs, are given in [10] . The problem of finding a correction that is valid for all inputs is computationally hard and therefore the approach is less efficient than the one presented in this paper, where we only provide a correction for the considered counterexamples.
Other existing work uses the difference between traces for fault localization.
Renieris and Reiss [22] assume the existence of a faulty trace and a number of successful traces. The difference between the traces points to suspicious parts of the program. Experimental data show that the quality of the fault localization strongly depends on the given set of traces. In the work of Groce [11] a specification is used to generate a successful trace that is as close as possible to a counterexample. The difference between failing and successful traces serves as a basis to explain the fault. Experimental data shows quite good results of their approach although for some examples manual assumptions have to be added in order to obtain insightful explanations. Comparison to our work can be found in Section 4. In [26] , Zeller's delta debugging approach is used to obtain a cause-effect chain of a fault. The differences between states in heuristically chosen points of interest in a failing and a successful program run deliver an explanation for the fault. Ball et al. [1] use multiple calls to a model checker and compare the obtained counterexamples to a successful trace. Transitions that do not appear in a correct trace are reported as a possible cause for the fault. All approaches that use the difference between traces need a successful run that is either generated or given by the user. The reported statements are fragments of the code present in the failing run but not in a successful runs. It is not guaranteed that the real fault location is reported or that the fragment of the code is minimal. It is possible that different failing runs lead to different fault candidates without a shared candidate. In contrary to these approaches, we do not compare runs on different inputs, but start with a counterexample and look for a minimal change in the program in order to generate a successful run with the same inputs. Thus, every reported location is a potential fault candidate and can be used to fix the fault for the used counterexample. It is guaranteed that the real fault is in the set of found candidates (assuming that the fault is in the considered fault model, c.f. 2.1). Therefore, we rerun the process on multiple counterexamples and use the intersection of the results to narrow down the number of fault candidates.
Other existing work does not report possible fault locations, but rather gives a deeper understanding of the nature of a failure. In [14] segments of the counterexample are identified that force the error to occur. Zeller and Hildebrandt [27] point out the significant difference between a failure inducing program input and a successful input. Groce and Visser [12] generate and analyze similar versions of a program run (successful and faulty runs) in order to obtain more information about the cause of the failure.
In the next section, we give the details of our approach in the general case. Section 3 gives the instantiation for the case of localizing faults in C programs as well as details on the used tools and methods. We show the applicability of the approach in Section 4 by examining two examples and explaining the gathered results. We conclude and give some outlook for future work in Section 5.
Fault Localization by Model Checking
In this section we describe, in general terms, how a model checker can be used for fault localization. Efficiency is not our prime concern in this section. In section3 we give a specific instantiation of the approach to localize faults in C programs.
Preliminaries
We have a system S which consists of a set of components C = {c 0 , . . . , c n−1 } and a set of signals V = V S ∪ V N D . Signal v i ∈ V S is defined by the component c i as function f i (V ), signals in V N D are chosen nondeterministically and describe inputs or nondeterministic behavior of the system. (In the following, we refer to both inputs and nondeterminism in the system as "inputs".) The exact definition of components and signals depends on the application domain. For hardware, for example, one can define the components to be gates and signals to be wires. (Cf. [15, 23] .) We assume that the system is sequential and operates in discrete time. That is, a run of the system is a countable sequence of valuations of the signals, including inputs and nondeterministic choices.
Besides the system, we are given a specification, which is a safety property ϕ. If the system does not fulfill ϕ, a model checker gives us a counterexample π: a finite sequence of assignments to signals in V C ⊆ V N D such that the system violates the specification.
We view the violation of the specification as a contradiction between the behavior specified by ϕ and that prescribed by S. Components of the system can be changed according to a fault model, which describes the allowed changes in behavior. E.g. a possible fault model for circuits: a replacement of a gate by a NAND or a NOR gate. We call a component that can be changed such that the error is avoided (while the rest of the system stays unchanged) a single fault diagnosis. The set of all such components is called the diagnosis set for single faults. We naturally extend this notation to tuples of components for dual or multiple faults.
Approach
Our approach consists of the following steps.
(i) We choose a parameter m that defines how many components may be changed in order to generate a system which obeys the specification. E.g., if m = 1 we look for single faults.
(ii) We construct a new system S . System S is obtained from S by making two modifications. First, we build V N D = V N D \ V C and V S = V S ∪ V C by adding components to assign the values given by the counterexample to V C . Note that the method how to do that depends on the system and the used model checker. While for hardware we usually have values for all nondeterministic signals and time steps, a model checker for software only gives values for a single trace through the program and gives no informations on statements that were not reached.
Second, we add to V N D new signals ab 0 , . . . , ab n−1 with Boolean domain and for every v i ∈ V S a signal nd i with the same domain as v i . We further replace the function f i of c i by f i = ¬ab i ∧ f i ∨ ab i ∧ nd i . Thus, if ab i = true, we suspect component c i to be incorrectly chosen and suspend the original behavior of the component. If ab i = false the component works as prescribed by the system.
(iii) We construct a new specification, ϕ = ¬ϕ ∧ ( i ab i ≤ m). The negated specification ϕ states that ϕ is violated in the modified system when a maximum of m components are suspended, i.e. there is no possibility to change maximal m components such that ϕ is fulfilled. (We identify true with the number 1.) (iv) We ask the model checker to produce a counterexample π that shows that S does not satisfy ϕ .
Suppose that a counterexample π for ϕ and S exists. The relevant part of the counterexample is the valuation of the ab i and nd i . The set of components {c i | ab i = true} is called a diagnosis. The existence of counterexamples shows that S does not contradict ϕ when a component in the diagnosis is suspended. If we replace the c i in the diagnosis with a component that behaves like nd i , the resulting system satisfies ϕ under the inputs prescribed by π . Note that inputs from π adhere to those from π if present. Thus, our claim is that the diagnosis found by our approach only contains components that can be used to fix the system for the given counterexample. Obviously, there is no guarantee that all we can fix the system regardless of the inputs. Finding a diagnosis that is valid for all counterexamples is much harder [15, 23] .
If no counterexample π exists, then the system cannot be fixed by replacing only m components. Typically, we start with m = 1, increasing m whenever diagnosis fails. To obtain all components, we can run the model checker several times, each time excluding the elements of the diagnosis already found. This is usually wasteful, as it forces many recomputations that can often be avoided by a small modification of the model checker.
Discussion
The theory presented here is quite general. It is not restricted to finite domains, as long as the modifications mentioned in pointii can be expressed. Likewise, the restriction that a signal is defined by exactly one component is unnecessary. If it is removed, general constraint systems can be diagnosed [8] .
The requirement that the system be a sequential, discrete-time system is quite relaxed: real time programs fit this requirement as a time step can be taken to be the execution of a single statement. Dense time (analog) systems are not amenable to our approach. Some possible application domains are sequential circuits, Boolean programs as used in [2] (cf. [17] ) and C programs, which are the topic of this paper.
Fault Localization for C Programs
In order to apply the approach to C programs, we first give a short description on the used model checker CBMC and bounded model checking for software. Subsection 3.2 presents our approach to finding faults in C programs, which is a variation on the general approach described in the last section.
CMBC
To implement fault localization for C, we use the software model-checker CBMC [3] . CBMC takes ANSI-C source code as input and handles pointers, arrays, and the C data-types without requiring abstraction. Specification is done using assert statements. CBMC adheres to the C semantics very precisely. Uninitialized variables, for example, introduce nondeterminism in the model, as do constructs for which the C standard is ambiguous.
Given a C program P and a bound k, CBMC constructs an unwinding P k of the program in which every statement is executed at most once. Loops are unwound by creating k copies of the loop along with the proper if statements for the case that the loop requires fewer than k iterations. Backward goto statements and recursive calls are dealt with similarly.
Listing 1 gives the result of unwinding the following loop to a depth of 3:
for (index = 0; index<5; index++) printf ("%d",index);
The assert in Line 12 is an unwind assertion, which is added by CBMC to decide whether or not the unwinding is deep enough. If it is violated, we found a run which traverses the loop more than three times. We have to call CBMC again with a higher bound for the unwinding.
In the unwound program, CBMC supports assume statements as well as assert statements. CBMC turns the unwound program into a propositional logic formula that is satisfiable if and only if there is an execution of the program that ends in the violation of an assert statement and satisfies all assume statements that it encounters. Satisfiability is checked by a standard SAT solver.
Fault Localization
Suppose we are given a counterexample that shows that an assertion is violated. The counterexample includes the values of the inputs and the nondeterministic constructs. Such a counterexample can be obtained from CBMC . As before, we will treat nondeterministic constructs and input values alike. We regard to the values chosen by the counterexample as i 0 , . . . , i l−1 .
Our choice of components is the set of expressions in the program, i.e., the right-hand sides of assignments, the conditions in if, while, and case statements, etc. Let us assume we have n such components: e 0 through e n−1 . Obviously, the choice of signals for our model are the variables.
The process of building the instrumented program includes unwinding to the depth k. We now construct P k according to the rules defined in Section 2.2 as follows:
The number of components that may be changed at a time determine how to instrument the code. In the following, we give the approach for single faults. The extension to multiple faults is straightforward and described in Section 3.4.
We change P to P by declaring a new variable diag at the beginning of P , whose value is chosen nondeterministically in the range of {0, . . . , n − 1}. We further replace each expression e i by the expression (diag == i ? nondet() : e i ) where nondet() returns a nondeterministic value. The value of diag determines which expression is suspended while at the same time all others behave as in the original program P . The instrumented program is unwound by CBMC resulting in P k . Finally, we use the assignments in counterexample π to set the respective variables in P k We negate the specification by ensuring that we report exactly those runs which do not violate any assertion in P k . Because an unwound program does not contain any loops, we can do so by adding a statement assert(false) to the end of P k and replacing every assert statement assert(c) in P k by an assume statement assume(c) in P k .
The new counterexample again is computed using CBMC. If no new counterexample is found we can look for dual faults or increase the number of unwinds.
Listing Keeping the unwind assertion unchanged in the previous step helps to adjust the correct number of unwinds.
The expressions in the diagnosis are exactly those that can be changed to satisfy the counterexample for a otherwise unchanged program. Note that we do not fix the choices of the nondeterministic constructs in P k that are not visited by the counterexample -by changing the condition of a branching statement, we still can find paths that contain nondeterminism. We thus report all expressions for which there is a successful execution of P k for some choice of the nondeterministic components respecting the choices made in the counterexample. (A more precise method would check that the execution is successful regardless of the behavior of the remaining nondeterministic components, but this introduces mixed quantifiers and is hard to compute.)
The full diagnosis for a given counterexample is built iteratively: when an expression is found, we add an assume statement to the program code to avoid that the same component is reported a second time. CBMC is run repeatedly until no more expressions are found. A more efficient way would be to add blocking clauses to the SAT instance.
Example
In the following we illustrate our approach using a simple C program. Listing 2 shows a program P that adds and multiplies the variables a and b. As specification we use an assert statement in Line 12. In Line 4, a is assigned 5, which is incorrect and should be 6. Note that there are no loops in the code and thus P k = P .
Assume value.) Listing 3 shows P k . In Line 3 the new variable diag is introduced. The counterexample is fixed in Line 6, but no value is fixed for e in Line 14. The statement assert(false) is added to the end of the program and each expression is replaced to include the appropriate check for the diag variable. The numbers used for the expressions correspond to the line numbers in Listing 2.
A run of a model checker on P k provides us with a counterexample with diag equals 4 and nondet() returns the value 6. It also enters the then-block of the if statement in Line 13 and assigns an nondeterministic value to e, and in the following also to a. Those last two assignments do not affect the specification and therefore are arbitrary. We see that the assignment to a in Line 6 is the correct value for all possible counterexamples. While in general wi have to find a expression which is valid for all possible counterexamples, in this example we can use this information directly to fix the original program: We replace the value 5 by 6 in Line 4 of Listing 2. There are no other diagnoses.
Dual fault Diagnosis
The extension of the approach for two (or more) faults is quite simple. We add two variables diag 1 and diag 2 instead of one; both are assigned to a nondeterministic value independently. An expression is in the diagnosis if one of the diag variables is set to its number. The rest of the approach is analogous to the single fault diagnosis described above.
To prevent every expression from being detected twice, we include the requirement that diag 1 < diag 2 . Furthermore, we first perform single fault diagnosis and exclude all tuples {diag 1 , diag 2 } such that diag 1 or diag 2 is in the single-fault diagnosis.
Discussion
By using expressions as components, we get a fine grained and quite natural model for localization of the fault. Examining expressions allows us to localize faults in assignments, function calls and return statements as well as in conditions for ifstatements or loops. Because we do not only examine if an expression contributes to a fault, but also if it is possible to change it to avoid the fault, our results are more exact than comparable methods. The corrected version of the program in Listing 2 assigns 6 to variable a in Line 7. Groce [11] , Zeller [26] , Ball et al. [1] , and the dynamic slice [24] for this example comprise all assignments from Line 4 to Line 7 while we are able to correctly pinpoint the fault to Line 4.
To find a diagnosis, we have to express a possible replacement for a expression. While it is relatively easy to do so for expressions or left hand sides of assignments, structural errors such as missing statements of forgotten braces for if-statements of loops are very hard to localize while more coarse methods might give a rough area of the program to be examined by the verification engineer.
Our approach returns all expressions that can be changed such that we can generate a correct run from a given counterexample. Note that in case of a faulty value which is propagated through the program, it is not possible to tell which of the involved expressions is to change if the program is weakly specified. Again have a look at the example in Listing 2. If we change the assert in Line 12 to assert(d == 36), it is not possible to tell if the fault is located in Line 4 or Line 7. Thus, we see that proper specification greatly improves the results of the approach. In order to produce a reliable diagnosis, we consider all assert statements of a program.
Examples
We show the applicability of the approach by considering two examples: The following section shows the results from the TCAS task of the Siemens test suite [6] . The Siemens suite contains five tasks which are widely used in literature. Each task consists of a C program and several versions of it with faults introduced. The position and kind of the faults is known. Besides the source-files, a number of test cases along with the information which of the code versions pass them is provided.
In the second example, we check the implementation of a data structure. Section 4.2 gives the details of a Red-Black Tree, its properties and how to check them 
TCAS
The TCAS task of the Siemens test suite constitutes an aircraft collision avoidance system. It consists of about 250 lines of code. To check the effectiveness of fault detecting tools, the authors of the suite created 41 versions of the program. Each was created manually by adding one or more faults, usually a change in a single line. In the following we will refer to the versions by "v1" to "v41". The suite also contains a set of 1600 test cases and their results on each of the TCAS-versions.
Because no specification is given, we use failing test cases as counterexamples and the correct value for the test case as specification. Except for v38, for which no test case is given, the test suite provides between 3 and 130 failing test runs for each program version, 1500 in total. The program contains 34 expressions in assignments and conditions, which were identified as potential cause of an error and instrumented as described above. Table 1 gives the number of test cases for each version of TCAS. The third column presents the size of the final diagnosis as well as the variation of the size of the diagnoses if they are calculated for each test case separately. The time in the fourth column gives the overall calculation time for each TCAS version. Note that in most cases a subset of the test cases would result in the same final diagnosis. Thus, a proper choice of test cases to consider would significantly decrease the calculation time. As such a choice would require analysis of the test cases, and we do not concentrate on performance, all available test cases were considered for computation.
The last column gives the result from the scoring function proposed by [22] . It is based on program dependency graphs (PDG) and gives the distance between the elements reported in the diagnosis and the faulty statements as number in the range 0 -1. Higher numbers are better. For three of the of the versions it is not possible to calculate this score because the fault is located in a #define statement and thus is not part of the PDG. All of the scores are quite good except for v33. We get the low score in v33 because in that example, the fault is a wrong index in initializing array elements in four lines that were not reported by our single fault approach. Despite the low rank, the result contains the only statement accessing the array and thus seems quite useful.
In [11] , Groce gives the scores for 5 versions of TCAS for whose his approach is applicable and compares them with results from Renieris and Reiss [22] . The paper compares several methods of which only the method with the lowest scores gives useful results for all five examples. Our approach results in comparable or better results than the best of their results.
We will now have a closer look at v2, its source code is given in Listing 4. Functions that are not important for the example and initialization of the variables are omitted. Constants are written in capital letters, global variables representing input values from the test case start with a capital letter, and local variables start with lower case letters. The failure was introduced in function Inhibit Biased Climb, Line 4 by confusing two constants, the original version is shown as annotation in the line above.
We demonstrate the fault with an error trace with 72 states reported by CBMC: It enters the body of the if-statement in Line 40. The call to NCB Climb in Line 42 is irrelevant as the test case is such that OBT() returns false and thus the assignment to need upward RA is false. In Line 43, NCB Descend is called which subsequently calls the function containing the fault, Inhibit Biases Climb. The fault has the effect that up pref is assigned true instead of false in Line 23 which results in a wrong assignment of false to result in Line 25 which is returned in Line 29. Thus, need downward RA in Line 43 is assigned false instead of true. This leads to the condition false in Line 48 and thus to setting the wrong return value in Line 51.
For this version of TCAS, we examined 69 test cases, each giving us a diagnoses with 10 to 18 elements. The final diagnosis found by our approach is the condition and left expression in Line 4 and Lines 8, 43, and 53 shown underlined. We examine if we can remove the error for the counterexample in each of the lines given as diagnosis: • Line 53 is obvious, if we return DOWNWARD RA in all cases, the assertion will not be violated anymore. In fact, a return statement of an erroneous function, or its call statement, can always be replaced by a call to a function which implements the correct behavior.
• If we set need downward RA to true in Line 43, we enter the correct else branch and return the correct value (need upward RA is false in the counterexample at hand).
• A repair in Line 8 is more complicated. A look at the counterexample showed that to remove the error, function OBT has to return false when called in Line 42, and true when called in Line 25. Because OBT compares two input variables, it should always return the same values within a run. A repair at this position seems unsuitable.
• The remaining elements of the diagnosis are the condition of the conditional statement in Line 4 and the expression where we introduced the fault in the same line. The condition is part of the diagnosis because the fault was introduced by wrongly using the larger constant MINSET instead of the smaller constant NOZCROSS. Thus, in the test cases leading to a wrong behavior, the return value of Inhibit Biased Climb was too high. By changing the condition to always select the second expression, which does not have this constant, we circumvent this behavior.
Although there is some work left for the verification engineer to decide which is the best position to repair the program, we see that the approach gives good results that only point to positions where we have the possibility to remove the failure. In addition to the diagnosis, the approach gives us the value of nondet() that was chosen to avoid the wrong behavior for each of the identified expressions. This information is valuable to understand how to repair the program. In the example above, the condition of the conditional statement in Line 4 always selects the second, smaller, expression for return. To avoid the fault, we can also we replace the left expression by a negative value, indicating that the returned value should be smaller.
Other versions of TCAS give even better replacements for the faulty expression. E.g. in version 7, the fault was introduced by initializing a constant by 501 instead of 500. Examination of the suggested value for this line resulted in the correct assignment of 500 in order to remove the fault for all test cases.
Dual Faults
In addition to single fault diagnosis, we looked for diagnoses where exactly two expressions are replaced. The results are given in Table 2 . Direct comparison with the results from Table 1 shows that the time needed for calculations of an example is quite comparable to the single fault case. Although a single run of CMBC takes about three times the time of single fault diagnosis, the overall runtime remains constant because the smaller size of the diagnosis rapidly leads to a smaller set of expressions to check (less calls of CBMC).
Red-Black Tree
A Red-Black tree is a self-balancing data-structure whose operations for insert, remove and search are performed in O(n log n) time [5] . It is a self-balancing binary search tree where each node has an color attribute. In addition to the requirements for binary search trees, following additional requirements have to be satisfied.
(i) A node is either RED or BLACK.
(ii) The root is BLACK.
(iii) All leaves are BLACK.
(iv) Both children of every RED node are BLACK.
(v) All paths from any given node to its leaf nodes contain the same number of BLACK nodes.
Insert-, remove-and search-operations are implemented as with usual binary search trees. After such an operation, the tree is examined to check if it is consistent with the rules above. If not, constant time rotation and repainting operations are performed to restore the consistency. This ensures that the tree remains balanced and guarantees the time bounds. We took the implementation to check from the Wikipedia entry on Red-Black trees 2 , and added the specification in form of assert statements as follows:
rule (ii): single assertion after a insert operation.
rule (iv) and binary search tree order: after insert operations, a routine is called which traverses the tree. If a red node is found, it checks that both children are black. The same routine also performs a comparison of the values to ensure the correct order of the binary search tree.
pointer access: Some of the functions implicitly assume that they are called with valid pointers. Assertions were added to ensure that pointers are not NULL when their fields are accessed even in the presence of faults in the code.
We don't have to check rule (i) as every node is initialized with color RED and only reassigned to RED or BLACK. Rule (iii) is always true because NULL pointers are treated as BLACK leafs. Rule (v) is not checked in this example. Note that all of the assert statements are present in the source code at the same time, allowing only diagnoses which satisfy all of them. The example was tested by examining some test cases where nodes are inserted in an empty tree in the following order (the description gives the assumed operations on a full functioning data structure): 0,5 This simple case initializes the tree with a node with value 0 and adds a new node with value 5 as its right child. No repainting or rotation of the node is necessary.
5,1
Analogous to the first test case, but the second node is inserted as left child of the root node.
5,1,2
The last operation creates an unbalanced tree. To restore the properties of Red-Black trees, two rotations and a reassignment of the colors are necessary.
5,9,4,6
The last insertion creates a balanced tree, but one RED node has a RED child, which contradicts Rule iv. To restore the properties, a reassignment of the colors in two passes is necessary.
The source code implementing Red-Black trees consists of approximately 250 lines of code. Because the data-structure uses pointers to connect the nodes, diagnosis on even this small examples showed to be quite hard. Allowing CBMC to insert arbitrary values for assignments to the pointers of the data-structure can cause a complete reordering of the tree, inducing a large state space to be explored. Thus, in this example, performing diagnosis requires more effort then checking a program with a small amount of nondeterminism or none at all.
We introduced two faults to the sources:
(i) To satisfy rule (ii), the first node inserted to a tree is colored BLACK. This assignment was changed to RED.
(ii) Every node first is inserted to the tree like in a usual binary search tree. Therefore the tree is traversed to find the proper position for the new node. In the traversion routine, a comparison was changed from <= to == leading to a wrong order of the tree.
The first fault resulted in only one element giving the correct line of the fault for every test case. The second fault does not cause an incorrect tree for the first test cases. The second and third test case, however, lead to a diagnosis of three expressions containing the correct line. The state space for the fourth test case exceeded memory limits for the full diagnosis, but it was possible to check one by one if a expression from a previous test cases was also a in the diagnosis for the fourth test case. That way, we were able to rule out one expression and resulted in a final diagnosis with two elements.
Conclusions and Future Work
We presented a new approach to localize faults in C programs by constructing a modified system that allows a given number of expressions to be changed arbitrarily. The new system contains the inverted specification from the original program. If we can find an error trace for the new system, we found expressions to repair the original program.
We have demonstrated the applicability of the approach on two examples. The approach still can be improved regarding the run time. A significant time of the process is taken by parsing, unwinding and generating the internal representation of the program. This representation does not change during calculation of the diagnosis for a single program. Overall running time would be significantly reduced by using blocking clauses and rerun the SAT solver to find the full diagnosis, instead of rerunning the complete CBMC process.
